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Abstract
We characterize all preference profiles at which the approval (voting) rule
is manipulable, under three extensions of preferences to sets of alterna-
tives: by comparison of worst alternatives, best alternatives, or by com-
parison based on stochastic dominance. We perform a similar exercise for
k-approval rules, where voters approve of a fixed number k of alternatives.
These results can be used to compare (k-)approval rules with respect to
their manipulability. Analytical results are obtained for the case of two
voters, specifically, the values of k for which the k-approval rule is mini-
mally manipulable – has the smallest number of manipulable preference
profiles – under the various preference extensions are determined. For
the number of voters going to infinity, an asymptotic result is that the k-
approval rule with k around half the number of alternatives is minimally
manipulable among all scoring rules. Further results are obtained by sim-
ulation and indicate that k-approval rules may improve on the approval
rule as far as manipulability is concerned.
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1 Introduction
Approval voting is a well accepted voting procedure.1 In approval voting each
voter can approve of as many alternatives as he wants. It is well known (Brams
and Fishburn, 1983, and the references therein) that this procedure is strategy-
proof (non-manipulable) if preferences are dichotomous, that is, each voter dis-
tinguishes only between a set of good and a set of bad alternatives. With more
refined preferences, however, strategy-proofness no longer holds.
In this paper we study the manipulability of the approval (voting) rule and
of a related procedure called k-approval (voting) rule. In a k-approval rule each
voter approves of exactly k alternatives. This procedure is less flexible than the
approval rule – voters can provide less information about their preferences – but
tends to be also less manipulable, as we will argue. Therefore, k-approval rules
may offer a good compromise between the approval rule and scoring rules such
as Borda count.
In Section 2 we introduce the approval rule and next we study its manipula-
bility. Since the approval rule (and also each k-approval rule) is a social choice
correspondence and can be multi-valued, we need to make assumptions about
extending the preferences (weak orderings) of voters over alternatives to sets of
alternatives. We do this in three ways: by comparing the worst alternatives of a
set, or by comparing the best alternatives of a set, or by comparing sets on the
basis of stochastic dominance using equal chances. In Section 3 we characterize
the non-manipulable preference profiles under approval voting for worst, best,
and stochastic dominance comparison. The special cases of strict preferences
follow as corollaries. Strategy-proofness under dichotomous preferences follows
as a special case as well.
In Section 4 we characterize the non-manipulable profiles under k-approval
rules, again for worst, best, and stochastic dominance comparison. We also
include a brief consideration of a lexicographic refinement of worst and best
comparison. For technical reasons attention in Section 4 is restricted to strict
preferences.
The main purpose of all these exercises is to compare the approval rule and k-
approval rules for different values of k with respect to manipulability and under
different assumptions about the voters’ preferences on sets of alternatives. This
comparison is based on a simple measure, namely the number of manipulable
preference profiles. The implicit assumption is therefore that all profiles are
equally likely. This is called ‘impartial culture’ in the literature. Unfortunately,
a complete analytical comparison is out of the question due to the combinatorial
complexity of the problem. For this reason, our comparative results are mainly
based on simulations and, thus, they are conjectures and suggestions rather than
theorems. A selection of the results of these simulations is presented in Section 5.
They give rise to some prudent conclusions concerning the manipulability of
the approval and k-approval rules under different assumptions on preference
extensions. In particular, they give support to the conjecture that k-approval
1It is used, for instance, to select candidates for councils of scientific communities such as
the Society for Social Choice and Welfare and the Game Theory Society.
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rules for specific values of k may be less susceptible to manipulation than the
approval rule.
Nevertheless, we also present some analytical comparison results. In Sec-
tion 4.4 we consider the two-voter case and compute the optimal k for different
preference extensions, that is, the value of k for which the k-approval rule is
minimally manipulable. For k = 1, the k-approval rule is just plurality voting.
In the two-voter case, this is non-manipulable (strategy-proof) under any rea-
sonable preference extension, including those considered in this paper. Plurality
voting, however, has a serious drawback. If (the) two voters agree on a good
second-ranked alternative but disagree on the first, then under plurality voting
this compromise is not chosen; it would be chosen, however, under any other
k-approval rule. Therefore, for each of the three mentioned preference compar-
isons and for k 6= 1 we have established the overall optimal value of k, and the
optimal value under the restriction k ≤ m/2, where m is the total the number
of alternatives. The latter restriction is justified by the desirable property of
‘citizen sovereignty’: for each alternative there is a preference profile resulting
in that alternative as the unique outcome. For 2 ≤ k ≤ m/2 we find k = 2
as the optimal value in case of best or stochastic dominance comparison, and
k ≈ √m in case of worst comparison.
On the other extreme, in Section 4.6 we let the number of voters go to
infinity and show that even among all scoring rules the k-approval rule with
k ∈ {(m − 1)/2, (m + 1)/2} if m is odd, and with k = m/2 if m is even, is
minimally manipulable. Of course, this result should be interpreted with care,
since the probability of manipulability by a single voter is very small anyway
if the number of voters is large. The basic intuition for this result is that the
(statistical) variance in scores is maximal for the mentioned value(s) of k, so that
any single voter’s probability of being able to change the outcome is minimal.
Related literature In most voting situations agents have the possibility to manip-
ulate the outcome of the vote by not voting according to their true preferences.
The classical theorem of Gibbard (1973) and Satterthwaite (1975) formalizes
this fact for social choice functions, which assign a unique alternative to every
preference profile, but it also holds for social choice correspondences under vari-
ous assumptions on preference extensions to sets (e.g., Barbera`, Dutta, and Sen,
2001). The present paper belongs to the strand of literature, initiated by Kelly
(1988, 1989), which accepts this phenomenon as a matter of fact and looks for
social choice rules which are second best in this respect, i.e., least manipulable.
Other references include Fristrup and Keiding (1998) and Aleskerov and Kur-
banov (1999). Maus, Peters, and Storcken (2007) contains a brief overview of
this literature.
Of course, counting the non-manipulable profiles is just one way of measuring
the degree of (non-)manipulability of voting rules. Many other approaches are
possible (e.g., Saari, 1990, or recently Campbell and Kelly, 2008). As already
mentioned, our measure of non-manipulability reflects ‘impartial culture’: each
preference profile is implicitly regarded as equally likely. The characterizations
of the sets of non-manipulable profiles derived in this paper, however, are also
3
needed when considering ‘partial culture’.
Notation We denote the cardinality of a set D by |D|.
2 Approval voting
The set of voters is N = {1, ..., n} with n ≥ 2 and the (finite) set of alternatives
is A with |A| = m ≥ 3. A preference is a weak ordering on A, i.e., a complete,
reflexive, and transitive binary relation on A. By W we denote the set of all
preferences. A preference profile w is a function from N to W , i.e., an element
of WN . For a preference profile w, w(i) is the preference of voter i ∈ N . For a
non-empty subset B of A, w(i)|B denotes the restriction of w(i) to the set B,
i.e., w(i)|B = {(x, y) ∈ B ×B | (x, y) ∈ w(i)}. Obviously, w(i)|A = w(i).
We next introduce some further notation. Let w be a preference profile and
i ∈ N . Let 1 ≤ ` ≤ m and suppose there exists a set of alternatives B with
|B| = `, (x, y) ∈ w(i) and (y, x) /∈ w(i) for all x ∈ B and y ∈ A \ B. Then we
denote this set by β`(w(i)). Observe that β`(w(i)) exists if and only if there are
` alternatives strictly preferred to the remaining m− ` alternatives according to
w(i); that is, β`(w(i)) contains only full indifference classes of w(i).
Also, for a subset B of A, by β(w(i)|B) we denote the set of best elements of
B according to w(i), that is, β(w(i)|B) = {x ∈ B | (x, y) ∈ w(i) for all y ∈ B}.
Similarly, ω(w(i)|B) denotes the set of worst elements of B according to w(i),
that is, ω(w(i)|B) = {x ∈ B | (y, x) ∈ w(i) for all y ∈ B}. The lower contour
set of a ∈ A at w(i) is the set L(a,w(i)) = {x ∈ A | (a, x) ∈ w(i)}. Observe
that a ∈ L(a,w(i)) by reflexivity of w(i).
In approval voting, each voter i ∈ N approves of k(i) alternatives, where
1 ≤ k(i) ≤ m is the choice of the voter. The outcome of the vote is the set
of those alternatives that receive the largest number of votes. (Observe that
excluding k(i) = 0 is without loss of generality since the option k(i) = m is
available.) To formalize this, a report of voter i is a pair r(i) = (w(i), k(i)) ∈
W×{1, . . . ,m} such that βk(i)(w(i)) exists. This implies that if a voter approves
of an alternative x he also has to approve of all alternatives which are indifferent
or strictly preferred to x according to w(i). By R we denote the set of all reports,
and by RN the set of all (report) profiles. We denote by
score(x, r) = |{i ∈ N | x ∈ βk(i)(w(i))}|
the number of voters who approve of alternative x ∈ A at profile r = (w, k) =
((w(i), k(i)))i∈N ∈ RN . The approval rule ϕ, defined by
ϕ(r) = {x ∈ A | score(x, r) ≥ score(y, r) for all y ∈ A}, r ∈ RN ,
assigns to each profile r the subset of alternatives with maximal score.
We need a few more notations. For r = (w, k) ∈ RN and i ∈ N , ϕ(r−i)
denotes the set of alternatives assigned by the approval rule to the restricted
profile r−i = (r1, ..., ri−1, ri+1, ..., rn) ∈ RN\{i} , that is,
ϕ(r−i) = {x ∈ A | score(x, r−i) ≥ score(y, r−i) for all y ∈ A} ,
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where score(x, r−i) = |{j ∈ N \ {i} | x ∈ βk(j)(w(j))}|. Finally, for (any)
a ∈ ϕ(r−i),
ϕ−(r−i) = {x ∈ A | score(x, r−i) = score(a, r−i)− 1}
is the (possibly empty) set of those alternatives that have score one less than
the elements of ϕ(r−i). We call the alternatives in ϕ(r−i) quasi-winners and
those in ϕ−(r−i) almost quasi-winners.2 These notations are convenient in view
of the following straightforward observation, which will be used throughout the
next section:
ϕ(r) =
{
ϕ(r−i) ∩ βk(i)(w(i)) if ϕ(r−i) ∩ βk(i)(w(i)) 6= ∅,
ϕ(r−i) ∪ [ϕ−(r−i) ∩ βk(i)(w(i))] if ϕ(r−i) ∩ βk(i)(w(i)) = ∅. (1)
In order to define (non-)manipulability of the approval rule at particular
profiles we need to be able to extend individual preferences to preferences over
non-empty subsets of alternatives. For a voter i in N and a preference w(i) ∈
W , we say that a binary relation ºw(i) on 2A \ {∅} extends w(i) if {x} ºw(i)
{y} ⇔ (x, y) ∈ w(i) holds for all x, y ∈ A. We write B ºw(i) C instead of
(B,C) ∈ºw(i). Also, Âw(i) and ∼w(i) denote the asymmetric and symmetric
parts of ºw(i), respectively.
In this paper we will consider (three or even more) different ways to extend
w(i) over alternatives to a binary relation over non-empty sets of alternatives.
Suppose that ºw(i) extends w(i) for all i ∈ N . For i ∈ N and r, s ∈ RN , we say
that r and s are i-deviations if r−i = s−i. In that case, clearly, ϕ (r−i) = ϕ (s−i)
and ϕ− (r−i) = ϕ− (s−i). The approval rule ϕ is manipulable by voter i at
r = (w, k) towards s if r and s are i-deviations and ϕ(s) Âw(i) ϕ(r). The
approval rule ϕ is not manipulable at r if for all voters i there is no i-deviation
s such that ϕ is manipulable by i at r towards s.
3 Manipulability of approval voting
The purpose of this section is to characterize the (report) profiles at which the
approval rule is not manipulable, for three different preference extensions.
3.1 Worst comparison
In this subsection we extend preferences to sets by considering worst alternatives
of those sets. Let i ∈ N and w(i) ∈W , then we define the extension ºw(i) by
B ºw(i) C ⇔ (x, y) ∈ w(i) for every x ∈ ω
(
w(i)|B
)
and y ∈ ω (w(i)|C)
for all non-empty sets B,C ⊆ A. Thus, B is weakly preferred to C whenever
every worst element of B is (weakly) preferred, according to w(i), to every worst
element of C.
2Assuming that there is no confusion about the identity of the voter whose vote is left out.
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Theorem 3.1 Let r = (w, k) ∈ RN . The approval rule ϕ is not manipulable
at r under worst comparison if and only if for each voter i at least one of the
following two statements holds:
(a) ϕ (r−i) ∩ βk(i) (w (i)) 6= ∅ and {x} ∼w(i) {y} for all x, y ∈ ϕ (r−i) ∩
βk(i) (w (i)).
(b) {x} ∼w(i) {y} for all x, y ∈ ϕ (r−i).
In words, condition (a) requires that if among the quasi-winners there are al-
ternatives belonging to the k(i) highest ranked alternatives of voter i, then i is
indifferent between those alternatives; and (b) requires that voter i is indifferent
between all quasi-winners.
Proof of Theorem 3.1. For the if-part, let s be an i-deviation of r.
In case (a), it follows by (1) that ϕ (r) = ϕ (r−i) ∩ βk(i) (w (i)). By the
assumption in (a), ϕ (r) = β
(
w (i) |ϕ(r−i)
)
. Again by (1), ϕ (s) ∩ ϕ (r−i) 6= ∅,
so for every x ∈ ϕ(r) = β (w (i) |ϕ(r−i)) it follows that {x} ºw(i) ϕ (s). So,
ϕ (r) ºw(i) ϕ (s).
Now consider case (b) and assume ϕ (r−i) ∩ βk(i) (w (i)) = ∅ otherwise we
are done by (a). Then ϕ(r−i) ⊆ ϕ(r), so we have ω
(
w(i)|ϕ(r)
)
= ϕ(r−i). Since,
by (1), ϕ (s) ∩ ϕ (r−i) 6= ∅, we have again ϕ (r) ºw(i) ϕ (s).
For the only if-part, suppose that there is an voter i for whom (a) nor (b)
holds. It is sufficient to prove that ϕ is manipulable at profile r by voter i. Ob-
serve that either there exist x, y ∈ ϕ (r−i) ∩ βk(i)(w (i)) such that {x} Âw(i)
{y}, or ϕ (r−i) ∩ βk(i) (w (i)) = ∅ and there exist x, y ∈ ϕ (r−i) such that
{x} Âw(i) {y}. In both cases, by (1), x, y ∈ ϕ (r). Now consider the report
s (i) = (w′ (i) , 1) of voter i such that β (w′ (i)) = {x}. Then, by (1) again,
ϕ (s) = {x} Âw(i) ϕ (r). ¤
We now consider the subclass of strict of preferences. This will enable us to
compare approval voting to k-approval voting, which is studied in the next
section.
3.1.1 Strict preferences
A preference w(i) is strict (or a linear ordering) if it is antisymmetric, i.e.,
(x, y) ∈ w(i) implies (y, x) /∈ w(i) for all x, y ∈ A with x 6= y. Let P denote
the set of all linear orderings on A, and S the set of all reports (w(i), k(i)) with
w(i) ∈ P . The following result considers manipulability of the approval rule ϕ
when restricted to SN .
Corollary 3.2 Let r = (w, k) ∈ SN . The approval rule ϕ, restricted to SN , is
not manipulable at r under worst comparison if and only if for each voter i at
least one of the following two statements holds:
(a) |ϕ (r−i) ∩ βk(i) (w (i)) | = 1.
(b) |ϕ (r−i)| = 1.
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Proof. For the only-if direction, note that if voter i can manipulate via a
preference inW , then i can also manipulate by a strict preference, by strictifying
the weak preference in any arbitrary way. Thus, the only-if direction follows
from Theorem 3.1. The if-direction is immediate from Theorem 3.1. ¤
3.2 Best comparison
In this subsection we extend preferences to sets by considering best alternatives
of those sets. Let i ∈ N and w(i) ∈W , then we define the extension ºw(i) by3
B ºw(i) C ⇔ (x, y) ∈ w(i) for every x ∈ β
(
w(i)|B
)
and y ∈ β (w(i)|C)
for all non-empty sets B,C ⊆ A. Thus, B is weakly preferred to C whenever
every best element of B is (weakly) preferred, according to w(i), to every best
element of C.
Theorem 3.3 Let r = (w, k) ∈ RN . The approval rule ϕ is not manipulable
at r under best comparison if and only if for each voter i at least one of the
following two statements holds:
(a) (x, y) ∈ w(i) for all x ∈ β (w(i)|ϕ(r−i)) and all y ∈ ϕ−(r−i).
(b) ϕ(r−i) ∩ βk(i)(w(i)) = ∅ and ϕ−(r−i) ∩ βk(i)(w(i)) 6= ∅.
In words, condition (a) requires that any best alternative among the quasi-
winners is preferred by i over all almost quasi-winners; and (b) requires that
none of the quasi-winners is among his k (i) highest ranked alternatives, but
some of the almost quasi-winners are among his k (i) highest ranked alternatives.
Proof of Theorem 3.3. For the if-part, let s be an i-deviation of r.
In case (a), it follows by (1) that there exists x ∈ ϕ(r) with x ∈ β (w(i)|ϕ(r−i)).
So by (a), {x} ºw(i) {y} for all y ∈ ϕ(r−i) ∪ ϕ−(r−i). This implies ϕ (r) ºw(i)
ϕ (s).
In case (b), by (1), ϕ(r) = ϕ(r−i) ∪
[
ϕ−(r−i) ∩ βk(i)(w(i))
]
. So ϕ(r) ºw(i)
{x} for all x ∈ ϕ(r−i) ∪ ϕ−(r−i). This implies again ϕ (r) ºw(i) ϕ (s).
For the only if-part, suppose that there is an voter i for whom (a) nor (b)
holds. It is sufficient to prove that ϕ is manipulable at profile r by voter i.
Observe that either (i) ϕ(r−i) ∩ βk(i)(w(i)) 6= ∅ and there exists y ∈ ϕ−(r−i)
such that {y} Âw(i) β
(
w(i)|ϕ(r−i)
)
; or (ii) ϕ−(r−i) ∩ βk(i)(w(i)) = ∅ and there
exists y ∈ ϕ−(r−i) such that {y} Âw(i) β
(
w(i)|ϕ(r−i)
)
. Note that, in both cases,
ϕ(r) ⊆ ϕ(r−i). For both cases, consider the report s (i) = (w′ (i) , 1) of voter
i such that β (w′ (i)) = {y}. Then by (1), ϕ (s) = ϕ(r−i) ∪ {y}, which implies
ϕ (s) Âw(i) ϕ (r). ¤
For strict preferences we have the following corollary. The proof is straightfor-
ward and therefore omitted.
3In order to avoid cumbersome notation we will use the same symbols for different prefer-
ence extensions in this paper.
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Corollary 3.4 Let r = (w, k) ∈ SN . The approval rule ϕ, restricted to SN , is
not manipulable at r under best comparison if and only if for each voter i at
least one of the following two statements holds:
(a) (x, y) ∈ w(i) for all y ∈ ϕ−(r−i), where {x} = β
(
w(i)|ϕ(r−i)
)
.
(b) ϕ(r−i) ∩ βk(i)(w(i)) = ∅ and ϕ−(r−i) ∩ βk(i)(w(i)) 6= ∅.
3.3 Stochastic dominance comparison
In this subsection comparisons of sets of alternatives are based on stochastic
dominance. To formalize this we need some further notions. Let u be a function
from A to R. Then u is said to be a utility function representing preference w(i)
of voter i, if for all alternatives x and y in A
(x, y) ∈ w(i) if and only if u(x) ≥ u(y) .
Let B and C be two nonempty subsets of alternatives. Voter i is said to prefer B
to C according to stochastic dominance at preference w(i), denoted as B ºw(i)
C, if∑
a∈B
1
|B|u (a) ≥
∑
a∈C
1
|C|u (a) for every utility function u representing w (i) .
This preference extension4 is based on the idea that, if we attach equal proba-
bilities to the alternatives in each set, then the expected utility of the resulting
lottery over B should be at least as high as the expected utility of the result-
ing lottery over C, for each utility function representing p(i). Clearly, and in
contrast to worst and best comparison in the preceding sections, this preference
extension is not complete: many sets are incomparable. Observe that our notion
of manipulability implies that a voter manages to obtain a preferred and thus
comparable set.
In the following theorem we characterize the non-manipulable profiles under
the stochastic dominance preference extension. To understand the proof, it is
sometimes convenient to keep in mind the familiar characterization (or defini-
tion) of stochastic dominance involving only probabilities. This characterization
says that a lottery ` is preferred over another lottery `′ if it can be obtained by
shifting probability in `′ to preferred alternatives.
Theorem 3.5 Let r = (w, k) ∈ RN . The approval rule ϕ is not manipulable at
r under stochastic dominance if and only if for each voter i at least one of the
following three statements holds:
(a) ϕ (r−i) ⊆ [A\βk(i) (w (i))] and ϕ− (r−i) ∩ βk(i) (w (i)) 6= ∅.
(b) ϕ (r−i) ∩ βk(i) (w (i)) 6= ∅ and {x} ∼w(i) {y} for all x, y ∈ ϕ (r−i) ∩
βk(i) (w (i)) and [A\βk(i) (w (i))] ∩ ϕ (r−i) 6= ∅.
4The stochastic dominance criterion to compare sets has been used before, see e.g. Barbera`,
Dutta and Sen (2001).
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(c) {x} ∼w(i) {y} for all x, y ∈ ϕ (r−i) and ϕ− (r−i) ⊆ L (x,w (i)) for some
x ∈ ϕ (r−i).
In words, these three cases can be described as follows. In case (a), no quasi-
winner but at least one almost quasi-winner belongs to the k(i) highest ranked
alternatives. In case (b) there are quasi-winners among the k (i) highest ranked
alternatives and voter i is indifferent between them, but there are also lower
ranked quasi-winners. In case (c) voter i is indifferent between the quasi-
winners, and all almost quasi-winners are lower ranked than some of the quasi-
winners.
For a proof of this theorem see the Appendix.
The following corollary (proof omitted) applies to strict preferences.
Corollary 3.6 Let r = (w, k) ∈ SN . The approval rule ϕ, restricted to SN , is
not manipulable at r under stochastic dominance comparison if and only if for
each voter i at least one of the following three statements holds:
(a) ϕ (r−i) ⊆ [A\βk(i) (w (i))] and ϕ− (r−i) ∩ βk(i) (w (i)) 6= ∅.
(b) ϕ (r−i) ∩ βk(i) (w (i)) = {x} for some x ∈ A and [A\βk(i) (w (i))] ∩
ϕ (r−i) 6= ∅.
(c) ϕ (r−i) = {x} for some x ∈ A and ϕ− (r−i) ⊆ L (x,w (i)) .
3.4 Dichotomous preferences
A preference w(i) ∈W is dichotomous if it has two indifference classes, i.e., there
are disjoint subsets B1 6= ∅ and B2 of A such that A = B1 ∪B2, (x, y), (y, x) ∈
w(i) for all x, y ∈ B1 and for all x, y ∈ B2, and (x, y) ∈ w(i), (y, x) /∈ w(i)
for all x ∈ B1 and y ∈ B2. Let D ⊆ W denote the subset of all dichotomous
preferences. A report r(i) = (w(i), k(i)) is in Rd if w(i) is dichotomous and
k(i) is the cardinality of the higher indifference class of w(i), i.e., k(i) = |B1|
in the notation above5. A report r(i) ∈ Rd is called dichotomous as well. In
the following corollary we show that the approval rule is strategy-proof when
restricted to dichotomous report profiles, under all three preference extensions
considered in this paper: this means that ϕ is manipulable at no r ∈ RNd under
any of these preference extensions. This result confirms well known results on
approval voting, see Brams and Fishburn (1983) and the references therein.
Corollary 3.7 The approval rule ϕ, restricted to RNd , is strategy-proof under
the worst, best, and stochastic dominance preference extensions.
Proof. Let r ∈ RNd , r(i) = (w(i), k(i)) for all i ∈ N .
Suppose that for some j ∈ N statement (b) in Theorem 3.1 does not hold.
Then there is x ∈ ϕ(r−j) with x ∈ βk(j)(w(j)), and, clearly, {x} ∼w(j) {y} for
5Observe that, in this case, k(i) is uniquely determined by w(i).
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all x, y ∈ ϕ (r−j)∩βk(j) (w (j)). Hence, (a) holds for j. Thus, ϕ is strategy-proof
under worst comparison.
Next, suppose that (a) in Theorem 3.3 does not hold for some i ∈ N . Then
there is a y ∈ ϕ−(r−i) with (y, x) ∈ w(i) and (x, y) /∈ w(i) for all x ∈ ϕ(r−i).
This implies that (b) holds for i. Thus, ϕ is strategy-proof under best compar-
ison.
Finally, suppose (c) in Theorem 3.5 does not hold for some i ∈ N . There are
two cases. If the first statement in (c) does not hold, then ϕ(r−i)∩βk(i)(w(i)) 6= ∅
and ϕ(r−i) ∩
[
A \ βk(i)(w(i))
] 6= ∅, so that (b) holds. If the second statement
in (c) does not hold, then there is y ∈ ϕ−(r−i) with {y} Âw(i) {x} for some x ∈
ϕ(r−i). In this case, if ϕ(r−i) ⊆
[
A \ βk(i)(w(i))
]
then (a) holds, and otherwise
(b) holds. Thus, ϕ is strategy-proof under stochastic dominance comparison. ¤
4 Manipulability of k-approval voting
A variation on approval voting is obtained by fixing the number of alternatives
that has to be approved by each voter. Specifically, for a profile p ∈ PN of strict
preferences, an alternative x ∈ A, and a number k ∈ {1, . . . ,m− 1}, we denote
by the k-score
scorek(x, p) = |{i ∈ N | x ∈ βk(p(i))}|
the total number of voters for who alternative x is among the k first ranked
alternatives at a profile p. The k-approval rule ϕk, defined by
ϕk(p) = {x ∈ A | scorek(x, p) ≥ scorek(y, p) for all y ∈ A}, p ∈ PN
assigns to each profile p the subset of alternatives with maximal k-score.6
Observe that it is, indeed, convenient to restrict attention to strict prefer-
ences, since otherwise we might have to split up indifference classes due to the
fact that the number of alternatives to be approved is now fixed.
The sets ϕk(p−i) and ϕ−k (p−i) of quasi-winners and almost quasi-winners
are defined analogously as for the approval rule. Also, we have the following
useful observation:
ϕk(p) =
{
ϕk(p−i) ∩ βk(p(i)) if ϕk(p−i) ∩ βk(p(i)) 6= ∅,
ϕk(p−i) ∪
[
ϕ−k (p−i) ∩ βk(p(i))
]
if ϕk(p−i) ∩ βk(p(i)) = ∅,
(2)
for all p ∈ PN , i ∈ N , and 1 ≤ k ≤ m− 1.
In what follows we characterize the profiles of preferences at which the k-
approval rule is not manipulable for different preference extensions, starting
with worst, best, and stochastic dominance comparison. The definitions of
(non)-manipulability of ϕk at a profile p are completely analogous to those for
the approval rule.
6Unlike the approval rule the k-approval rule is a scoring rule, see Section 4.6. Note,
further, that the case k = m is uninteresting.
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4.1 Worst comparison
For the definition of the worst comparison preference extension see Section 3.1.
The following theorem characterizes all profiles at which the k-approval rule
is not manipulable under worst comparison.
Theorem 4.1 Let p ∈ PN . The k-approval rule ϕk is not manipulable at
p under worst comparison if and only if for each voter i at least one of the
following three statements holds:
(a) |ϕk(p−i) ∩ βk(p(i))| = 1.
(b) |ϕk(p−i)| = 1.
(c) A \ βk(p(i)) ( ϕk(p−i).
In words, condition (a) requires that exactly one of that voter i’s k highest
ranked alternatives is a quasi-winner; (b) requires that there is a unique quasi-
winner; and (c) requires that the quasi-winners are a strict subset of the m− k
lowest ranked alternatives.
Proof of Theorem 4.1. For the if-part, let i ∈ N and let q be an i-deviation
of p. Assume that at least one of the cases (a), (b), and (c) holds. We show
that voter i cannot manipulate from p to q.
In case (a), let {x} = ϕk(p−i) ∩ βk(p(i)). By (2), ϕk(p) = {x}. Again by
(2), either ϕk(q) ⊆ ϕk(p−i) or ϕk(p−i) ⊆ ϕk(q). In the first case, if x ∈ ϕk(q),
then ϕk(p) = {x} ºp(i) ϕk(q); if x /∈ ϕk(q) then ϕk(q) ⊆ A \ βk(p(i)) so that
again ϕk(p) = {x} ºp(i) ϕk(q). In the second case, ϕk(p) = {x} ⊆ ϕk(q), hence
ϕk(p) ºp(i) ϕk(q).
In case (b), let ϕk(p−i) = {x} for some alternative x. If x ∈ βk(p(i)) we are
done by case (a). If x /∈ βk(p(i)) then by (2), ϕk(p) = {x}∪
[
ϕ−k (p−i) ∩ βk(p(i))
]
and, thus, ω(p(i)|ϕk(p)) = x. Further, also by (2), ϕk(q) = {x} or ϕk(q) =
{x} ∪ [ϕ−k (p−i) ∩ βk(q(i))]; in both cases, (x, ω(p(i)|ϕk(q))) ∈ p(i) and, thus,
ϕk(p) ºp(i) ϕk(q).
In case (c), by (2) we have ϕk(p) = ϕk(p−i)∩βk(p(i)) and ϕk(q) = ϕk(q−i)∩
βk(q(i)) = ϕk(p−i) ∩ βk(q(i)). If βk(q(i)) = βk(p(i)) then ϕk(p) = ϕk(q).
Otherwise, since A \ βk(p(i)) ( ϕk(p−i), there is a y ∈ [A \ βk(p(i))] ∩ ϕk(q).
Hence, ϕk(p) ºp(i) ϕk(q).
For the only-if part, suppose that there is a voter i ∈ N such that none
of the three cases (a), (b), and (c) holds. It is sufficient to prove that ϕk is
manipulable at profile p by voter i. For this, in turn, it is sufficient to prove
that i can manipulate at profile p for the following two cases.
Case (i): ϕk(p−i) ∩ βk(p(i)) = ∅ and |ϕk(p−i)| ≥ 2.
Let b = β
(
p(i)|ϕk(p−i)
)
. Take q(i) such that the positions in p(i) of b and one
of the alternatives in βk(p(i)) are swapped. Then ϕk(q) = {b} and ϕk(q) Âp(i)
ϕk(p), hence voter i can manipulate at profile p towards q.
Case (ii): |ϕk(p−i) ∩ βk(p(i))| ≥ 2 and [A \ βk(p(i))] * ϕk(p−i).
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Let w = ω
(
p(i)|ϕk(p−i)∩βk(p(i))
)
and y ∈ A \ [βk(p(i))∪ϕk(p−i)]. Let q(i) be
obtained from p(i) by swapping the positions of the alternatives w and y. By
(2), ϕk(p) = ϕk(p−i) ∩ βk(p(i)) and ϕk(q) = ϕk(p−i) ∩ βk(p(i)) \ {w} it follows
that ϕk(q) Âp(i) ϕk(p), proving that ϕk is manipulable by voter i at profile p
towards q. ¤
4.2 Best comparison
For the definition of the best comparison preference extension see Section 3.2.
The following theorem characterizes all profiles at which the k-approval rule
is not manipulable under best comparison.
Theorem 4.2 Let p ∈ PN . The k-approval scoring rule ϕk is not manipulable
at p under best comparison if and only if for each voter i at least one of the
following three statements holds:
(a)
(
β(p(i)|ϕk(p−i)), x
) ∈ p(i) for all x ∈ ϕ−k (p−i).
(b) ϕk(p−i) ∩ βk(p(i)) = ∅ and ϕ−k (p−i) ∩ βk(p(i)) 6= ∅.
(c) |ϕk(p−i) ∩ βk(p(i))| > |A \ [βk(p(i)) ∪ ϕk(p−i)]|.
In words, condition (a) requires that the best alternative among the quasi-
winners is preferred over all almost quasi-winners; (b) requires that no quasi-
winner is among his k first ranked alternatives, but some of the almost quasi-
winners are; and (c) requires that the number of the voter’s k highest ranked
alternatives among the quasi-winners is larger than the number of alternatives
that are neither among his k highest ranked nor among the quasi-winners.
Proof of Theorem 4.2. For the if-part, let q be an i-deviation of p. Note
that ϕk(p−i) = ϕk(q−i) and ϕ−k (p−i) = ϕ
−
k (q−i). Assume that at least one of
the cases (a), (b), and (c) holds. We show that voter i cannot manipulate from
p to q.
In case (a), for both cases occurring in (2), we obtain β
(
p(i)|ϕk(p)
)
=
β
(
p(i)|ϕk(p−i)
)
. Since β
(
p(i)|ϕk(q)
) ∈ ϕk(p−i)∪ϕ−k (p−i) and by the assumption
for case (a), we conclude that ϕk(p) ºp(i) ϕk(q).
In case (b), again using (2), we have ϕk(p) = ϕk(p−i)∪ [ϕ−k (p−i)∩βk(p(i))],
hence β
(
p(i)|ϕk(p)
)
= β
(
p(i)|ϕ−k (p−i)∩βk(p(i))
)
; and ϕk(q) ∈ ϕk(p−i)∪[ϕ−k (p−i)∩
βk(q(i))]. By the assumptions for this case, ϕk(p) ºp(i) ϕk(q).
In case (c), it is easy to see that |A \ ϕk(p−i)| < |βk(p(i))| = k = |βk(q(i))|,
hence βk(q(i)) ∩ ϕk(p−i) 6= ∅. Therefore, by (2) we have ϕk(p) = ϕk(p−i) ∩
βk(p(i)) and ϕk(q) = ϕk(p−i) ∩ βk(q(i)) ⊆ ϕk(p−i). Thus, also in this case
ϕk(p) ºp(i) ϕk(q).
For the only-if part, suppose that there is a voter i ∈ N such that none
of the three cases (a), (b), and (c) holds. It is sufficient to prove that ϕk is
manipulable at profile p by voter i. For this, in turn, it is sufficient to prove
that i can manipulate at profile p for the following two cases.
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Case (i): There is an x ∈ ϕ−k (p−i) such that (x, b) ∈ p(i), where b =
β
(
ϕk(p−i), p(i)|ϕk(p−i)
)
; ϕk(p−i) ∩ βk(p(i)) 6= ∅; and |ϕk(p−i) ∩ βk(p(i))| ≤
|A \ [βk(p(i)) ∪ ϕk(p−i)]|.
For this case, note that x ∈ βk(p(i)). By the assumptions for this case we
can take a q(i) ∈ P with x ∈ βk(q(i)) and ϕk(p−i) ∩ βk(q(i)) = ∅. Hence,
x ∈ ϕk(q) \ϕk(p) and, thus, ϕk(q) Âp(i) ϕk(p). So i can manipulate at profile p
towards q.
Case (ii): There is an x ∈ ϕ−k (p−i) such that (x, b) ∈ p(i), where b =
β
(
p(i)|ϕk(p−i)
)
; and ϕ−k (p−i) ∩ βk(p(i)) = ∅.
In this case, ϕk(p) = ϕk(p−i). Note that the sets βk(p(i)), ϕk(p−i), and
ϕ−k (p−i) are pairwise disjoint. So we can take q(i) ∈ P such that x ∈ βk(q(i))
and ϕk(p−i) ∩ βk(q(i)) = ∅. Then ϕk(q) ⊇ ϕk(p−i) ∪ {x}, so x ∈ ϕk(q) \ ϕk(p),
thus ϕk(q) Âp(i) ϕk(p) and i can manipulate at profile p towards q. ¤
4.3 Stochastic dominance comparison
For the definition of the stochastic dominance comparison preference extension
see Section 3.3.
The following theorem characterizes all profiles at which the k-approval rule
is not manipulable under stochastic dominance comparison. Its proof is placed
in the Appendix.
Theorem 4.3 Let p ∈ PN . The k-approval scoring rule ϕk is not manipulable
at p under stochastic dominance comparison if and only if for all voters i at
least one of the following five statements holds:
(a) A \ βk(p(i)) ( ϕk(p−i).
(b) ϕk(p−i) ⊆ [A \ βk(p(i))] and ϕ−k (p−i) ∩ βk(p(i)) 6= ∅.
(c) ϕk(p−i)∩βk(p(i)) = {w} for some w ∈ A and [A\βk(p(i))]∩ϕk(p−i) 6= ∅.
(d) ϕk(p−i) = {w} for some w ∈ A and ϕ−k (p−i) ⊆ L(w, p(i)).
(e) ϕk(p−i) = {w} for some w ∈ A and |ϕ−k (p−i) ∩ L(w, p(i))| > m− k.
In words, these five cases can be described as follows. In case (a), at least one
of voter i’s k highest ranked alternatives and all of his lower ranked alternatives
are quasi-winners. In case (b), no quasi-winner but at least one almost quasi-
winner is among his k highest ranked alternatives. In case (c) there is a unique
quasi-winner among voter i’s k highest ranked alternatives, but there are lower
ranked quasi-winners as well. In case (d) there is a unique quasi-winner, which
is preferred by i to all almost quasi-winners. In case (e) there is again a unique
quasi-winner, and among the almost quasi-winners there are more than m − k
alternatives worse than the unique quasi-winner.
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4.4 The two-voter case
In this subsection we concentrate on the two-voter case and consider the follow-
ing question: which k-approval rule is least (or minimally) manipulable, under
various assumptions on preference extensions as studied in the preceding sec-
tions?
We start with a simple theorem, which will be derived from Theorems 4.1,
4.2, and 4.3, but also easily follows directly. It states that ϕ1 is strategy-proof,
i.e., not manipulable at any profile p.
Theorem 4.4 Let n = 2. Then the 1-approval rule ϕ1 is strategy-proof under
worst, best, and stochastic dominance comparison.
Proof. Let p = (p(1), p(2)) be a preference profile and let k = 1. Note that
(b) in Theorem 4.1 is always satisfied: this shows strategy-proofness under
worst comparison. In Theorem 4.2, (a) reduces to β(p(1)) = β(p(2)) and
(b) to β(p(1)) 6= β(p(2)): this shows strategy-proofness under best compar-
ison. Finally, in Theorem 4.3, (b) reduces to β(p(1)) 6= β(p(2)) and (d) to
β(p(1)) = β(p(2)): this shows strategy-proofness under stochastic dominance
comparison. ¤
This observation might make our quest for minimally manipulable rules fu-
tile, were it not the case that the 1-approval rule (i.e., plurality rule) is not
unambiguously attractive. As an example, consider the case where voter 1 has
preference p(1) : xz . . . y and voter 2 has preference p(2) : yz . . . x (notations
obvious). Then ϕ1(p) = {x, y} but ϕ2(p) = {z}. So it seems that ϕ2 offers a
better compromise in this case than ϕ1.
Moreover, for more than two voters and apart from a few particular cases,
Theorem 4.4 no longer holds.
We will now consider the three cases (worst, best, and stochastic dominance
comparison) separately.
4.4.1 Worst comparison for two voters
The non-manipulable profiles for two voters under worst comparison are easily
described using Theorem 4.1.
Corollary 4.5 Let n = 2 and 2 ≤ k < m. Let p ∈ P and consider worst
comparison.
(a) If k ≤ (m+1)/2, then ϕk is not manipulable at p if and only if |ϕk(p)| = 1,
or equivalently,
|βk(p(i)) ∩ βk(p(2))| = 1 .
(b) If k > (m+1)/2, then ϕk is not manipulable at p if and only if |ϕk(p)| =
2k −m, or equivalently,
|βk(p(i)) ∩ βk(p(2))| = 2k −m .
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Proof. Case (b) in Theorem 4.1 does not apply. If case (a) in Theorem 4.1
applies then we have |βk(p(1))∩βk(p(2))| = 1 (or, equivalently, |ϕk(p)| = 1), but
this is possible if and only if k ≤ (m+ 1)/2. If case (c) in Theorem 4.1 applies
then we have |βk(p(1))∩βk(p(2))| = 2k−m (or, equivalently, |ϕk(p)| = 2k−m),
but this is possible if and only if k ≥ (m+ 1)/2; but for k = (m+ 1)/2 we have
2k −m = 1, so that we are back in case (a). ¤
Denote by η(m, k) the number of profiles (for two voters) at which ϕk is not
manipulable. By straightforward counting we obtain the following result for the
number of manipulable profiles for two voters under worst comparison.
Theorem 4.6 Let n = 2 and 2 ≤ k < m. Consider worst comparison. Then
η(m, k) =

m! k
(
m− k
k − 1
)
k! (m− k)! if k ≤ (m+ 1)/2
m!
(
k
2k −m
)
k! (m− k)! if k > (m+ 1)/2 .
From this theorem we derive the following corollary (see the Appendix for
a proof), which states some facts about k as far as non-manipulability is con-
cerned. (The exact meaning of k∗ being close to
√
m in part (a) is explained in
the proof.)
Corollary 4.7
(a) η(m, k) increases in k between 2 and an integer k∗, which is close to
√
m,
and decreases between k∗ and 12 (m− 1).
(b) η(m, k) increases between 12 (m− 1) and (m− 1).
(c) The (m − 1)-approval scoring rule is second best since η(m, (m − 1)) >
η(m, k) for all m− 1 > k ≥ 2.
The first-best value of k is k = 1 (Theorem 4.4), but ϕ1 has the drawback
that it does not give much opportunity for compromises. Among other values of
k, the value k = m−1 is best. We might, however, prefer to have k ≤ (m+1)/2,
for the following reason. Call ϕk citizen-sovereign if for every alternative x ∈ A
there is a profile p ∈ P with ϕk(p) = {x}. It is not difficult to see that ϕk is
citizen-sovereign for any number of voters n ≥ 2 if k ≤ (m + 1)/2. For n = 2
and k > (m + 1)/2, however, ϕk is not citizen-sovereign. Hence, if we restrict
ourselves to citizen-sovereign rules with k ≥ 2, then the best rule is ϕk∗ , where
k∗ is close to
√
m.
4.4.2 Best comparison for two voters
The non-manipulable profiles for two voters under best comparison can be de-
rived from Theorem 4.2.
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Corollary 4.8 Let n = 2 and 2 ≤ k < m. Let p ∈ P and consider best
comparison.
(a) If k ≤ m/2 then ϕk is not manipulable at p ∈ P if and only if either
β(p(1)) ∈ βk(p(2)) and β(p(2)) ∈ βk(p(1))
or
βk(p(1)) ∩ βk(p(2)) = ∅ .
(b) If k > m/2 then ϕk is not manipulable at any p ∈ P .
Proof. If k > m/2 then case (c) in Theorem 4.2 applies to all p ∈ P , and
if k ≤ m/2 then case (c) applies to no p ∈ P . This implies part (b) of the
corollary, and it also implies that for k ≤ m/2 we only have to consider cases
(a) and (b) in Theorem 4.2. It is easily seen that these cases result in the two
cases in part (a) of the corollary. ¤
The number of non-manipulable profiles η(m, k) if k ≤ m/2 is computed in
the following theorem.
Theorem 4.9 Let n = 2 and 2 ≤ k ≤ m/2. Consider best comparison. Then
η(m, k) = m! (m− 2)! (k − 1)2 +m! (m− 1)! +m! [(m− k)!]2/(m− 2k)! .
Proof. The first case in (a) in Corollary 4.8 with β(p(1)) 6= β(p(2)) results in
m! (k − 1)
(
m− 2
k − 2
)
(k − 1)! (m− k)!
different non-manipulable profiles. This yields the first term of η(m, k) in the
theorem. If β(p(1)) = β(p(2)) then this number is simply equal to m! (m− 1)!,
which yields the second term. The second case in (a) in Corollary 4.8 results in
m!
(
m− k
k
)
k! (m− k)!
different non-manipulable profiles, which simplifies to the third term for η(m, k)
in the theorem. ¤
If we require k 6= 1 and citizen-sovereignty, i.e., k ≤ m/2, then the optimal
value of k with respect to non-manipulability, i.e., the value of k that maximizes
η(m, k), is equal to 2.
To see this, note that by Theorem 4.9 and some elementary calculations we
have for 2 < k ≤ m2 :
η(m, 2) > η(m, k)
⇔ (m− 2)(m− 3) > k(k − 2) +
k factors︷ ︸︸ ︷
(m− k)(m− k − 1) · . . . · (m− 2k + 1)
(m− 2)(m− 3) · . . . · (m− k + 1)︸ ︷︷ ︸
k − 2 factors
.
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Since k > 2 it is therefore sufficient to prove that
(m− 2)(m− 3) > k(k − 2) + (m− 2k + 2)(m− 2k + 1) .
This simplifies to (4k − 8)m > 5k2 − 8k − 4. Since m ≥ 2k, it is sufficient to
show that 3k2 − 8k + 4 > 0, which indeed holds for k > 2.
4.4.3 Stochastic dominance comparison for two voters
The non-manipulable profiles for two voters under stochastic dominance com-
parison can be derived from Theorem 4.3.
Corollary 4.10 Let n = 2 and 2 ≤ k < m. Let p ∈ P and consider stochastic
dominance comparison. Then ϕk is not manipulable at p if and only if at least
one of the following holds.
(a) βk(p(1)) ∩ βk(p(2)) = ∅.
(b) |βk(p(1)) ∩ βk(p(2))| = 1.
(c) βk(p(1)) ∩ βk(p(2)) 6= ∅ and [A \ βk(p(1))] ∩ [A \ βk(p(2))] = ∅.
Proof. For n = 2 and k ≥ 2 cases (d) and (e) in Theorem 4.3 are not possible.
Case (c) in Theorem 4.3 reduces to case (b) above, and case (a) in Theorem 4.3
reduces to case (c) above. Finally, case (b) in the theorem reduces to case (a)
above. ¤
From this description we can again derive the number of manipulable profiles
η(m, k).
Theorem 4.11 Let n = 2, k ≥ 2, and consider stochastic dominance compari-
son.
(a) If k ≤ m/2 then
η(m, k) = m! [(m− k)!]2/(m− 2k)! +m! k2 [(m− k)!]2/(m− 2k + 1)! .
(b) If k > m/2 then
η(m, k) = m! [k!]2/(2k −m)! .
Proof. If k ≤ m/2 then (c) in Corollary 4.10 is not possible, and cases (a) and
(b) in the corollary are mutually exclusive. In case (a) of Corollary 4.10 there
are
m!
(
m− k
k
)
k! (m− k)!
non-manipulable profiles, resulting in the first term for η(m, k), and in case (b)
of the corollary there are
m! k
(
m− k
k − 1
)
k! (m− k)!
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non-manipulable profiles, resulting in the second term for η(m, k).
If k > m/2 then case (a) of Corollary 4.10 is not possible, and (b) is a special
case of (c). For the latter case, we just have to count the number of profiles
for which [A \ βk(p(1))]∩ [A \ βk(p(2))] = ∅, since the other condition is always
fulfilled. This number is equal to
m!
(
k
m− k
)
k! (m− k)!
which is equal to m! [k!]2/(2k −m)! . ¤
About the value of k that maximizes η(m, k), so the value of k that is optimal
with respect to non-manipulability, we can say the following.
1. For 2 ≤ k ≤ m2 , the number of non-manipulable profiles decreases with k,
and thus k = 2 is optimal.
2. For m2 < k ≤ m − 1, the number of non-manipulable profiles increases
with k, and thus k = m− 1 is optimal.
3. η(m, 2) > η(m,m − 1) for m ≥ 4, so k = 2 is the overall optimal value
between 2 and m− 1.
To prove these statements, first assume k ≤ m2 . Then, using Theorem 4.11(a)
and simplifying, we derive
η(m, k + 1) < η(m, k)⇔ 3k2 − 2km− 1 < 0 ,
and it is easily seen that the right hand side holds for all 2 ≤ k ≤ m2 . Next,
assume m2 < k ≤ m − 1. Then, using Theorem 4.11(b) and simplifying, we
derive
η(m, k + 1) > η(m, k)⇔ 3k2 + k(4− 4m) +m2 − 3m+ 1 < 0 .
The roots of the quadratic expression in k at the right hand side are 23 (m −
1)± 13
√
m2 +m+ 1; the smaller root is smaller than m2 , whereas the larger root
is larger than m − 1. Thus, the right hand side holds for all m2 < k ≤ m − 1.
Finally, by Theorem 4.11 again,
η(m, 2) > η(m,m− 1)⇔ m > 3 ,
so that k = 2 is the overall optimal value of k for 2 ≤ k ≤ m− 1.
4.5 Lexicographic worst and best comparison
In this subsection we briefly consider a natural extension of worst and best
comparison, namely lexicographic worst and best comparison. These preference
extensions to sets are given by the following recursive definition. For two sub-
sets B and C of alternatives, we say that B is (weakly) preferred to C under
lexicographic worst comparison by voter i with preference p(i) if
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1. C = ∅, or
2. B and C are non-empty and
(
ω(p(i)|B), ω(p(i)|C)
) ∈ p(i), or
3. ω(p(i)|B) = ω(p(i)|C) =: w and B \ {w} is preferred to C \ {w} under
lexicographic worst comparison by voter i with preference p(i).
The definition for lexicographic best comparison is obtained simply by re-
placing the worst alternative by the best alternative, i.e., by replacing ω(·) by
β(·). Thus, under lexicographic worst comparison a voter first considers the
worst elements of B and C. If these are different, then he prefers the set with
the better worst element. Otherwise, the voter considers the second worst el-
ements. If these are different, then he prefers the set with the better second
worst element. Otherwise, he considers the third worst elements, etc. Similarly,
of course, for lexicographic best comparison.
Complete characterizations of the non-manipulable profiles for both lexico-
graphic worst and lexicographic best comparison can be given but are rather
technical (even more so than for stochastic dominance comparison) and there-
fore not included.
Note that any profile that is manipulable under worst [best] comparison is
also manipulable under lexicographic worst [best] comparison. Hence, the set of
non-manipulable profiles under lexicographic worst [best] comparison is always
a subset of the set of non-manipulable profiles under worst [best] comparison.
It is not very difficult to check (we omit the proof for the sake of briefness)
that all the profiles listed in Corollary 4.5, that is, all two-voter profiles that
are non-manipulable under worst comparison, are also non-manipulable under
lexicographic worst comparison, so that in this case considering lexicographic
worst comparison instead of just worst comparison does not make any difference.
The non-manipulable profiles coincide, and the optimal value of k as far as non-
manipulability is concerned, is the same as in Section 4.4.1.
For two voters and lexicographic best comparison the situation is different
and the set of non-manipulable profiles is a strict subset of the set of non-
manipulable profiles under best comparison, that is, the set of profiles described
in Corollary 4.8. To be precise, we have the following result, which can be
derived from Corollary 4.8 (the proof is again left to the reader).
Corollary 4.12 Let n = 2 and 2 ≤ k < m. Let p ∈ P and consider lexico-
graphic best comparison.
(a) If k ≤ m/2 then ϕk is not manipulable at p ∈ P if and only if either
{β(p(1))} = {β(p(2))} = βk(p(1)) ∩ βk(p(1))
or
βk(p(1)) ∩ βk(p(2)) = ∅ .
(b) If k > m/2 then ϕk is not manipulable at any p ∈ P .
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In this case, the total number of non-manipulable profiles for 2 ≤ k ≤ m/2
is equal to
η(m, k) =
m! [(m− k)!]2 (m− 2k + 2)
(m− 2k + 1)!
and this number is decreasing in k, so that k = 2 is the value of k that minimizes
manipulability subject to 2 ≤ k ≤ m/2, just as in the best comparison case.
The proofs of these facts are somewhat simpler than for the best comparison
case. For the sake of briefness we omit them.
4.6 An asymptotic result
We start with defining the class of all scoring rules. A (normalized) scoring
vector is a vector s = (s1, s2, . . . , sm) ∈ Rm with 1 = s1 ≥ s2 ≥ . . . ≥ sm = 0.
For a preference pi ∈ P and an alternative x ∈ A let t(pi, x) denote the rank
of x in the preference pi, i.e., t(pi, x) = k where k = 1 if {x} = β(pi) and
{x} = βk(pi) \ βk−1(pi) otherwise.
For a scoring vector s, a profile p ∈ PN , and an alternative x ∈ A, we denote
by the s-score
scores(x, p) =
∑
i∈N
st(p(i),x)
the total score that x obtains under profile p and score vector s. The scoring
rule with scoring vector s is defined by
ϕs(p) = {x ∈ A | scores(x, p) ≥ scores(y, p) for all y ∈ A}, p ∈ PN .
Clearly, a k-approval rule is a scoring rule with scoring vector s such that s1 =
. . . = sk = 1 and sk+1 = . . . = sm = 0.
Now, in what follows, we fix the number of alternativesm and let the number
of voters go to infinity. We will show, formally, that then any two scoring rules
lead to the same expected values of the highest score, second highest score, and
so on, up to a multiplicative constant proportional to the standard deviations of
the scoring vectors: the higher this standard deviation the larger the differences
between the expected scores. Since the standard deviation is maximal for k-
approval rules with k around m/2, we can conclude by the law of large numbers
that the proportion of manipulable profiles is smallest for this rule.7
In order to derive the announced result, assume that voter preferences are
drawn from the uniform distribution over P – that is, according to ‘impartial
culture’. Let Y = (Ypi)pi∈P denote the random vector giving the numbers of
voters for each preference (so
∑
pi∈P Ypi = n). Then Y has a multinomial distri-
bution with mean (n/m!)1, where 1 is a vector with all entries equal to 1. Write
A = {x1, . . . , xm}, then for a scoring vector s the random vector Y gives rise to
7We thank Eric Beutner (Maastricht University) for helpful discussions on this topic.
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a random vector of scores Xs = (Xs1 , . . . , X
s
m) where X
s
j =
∑
pi∈P Ypist(pi,xj) for
j = 1, . . . ,m. Let
σ(s) =
√
s21 + . . .+ s2m
m
− s¯2
denote the standard deviation of the scoring vector s, where s¯ = (s1+. . .+sm)/m
is the mean of s. Proposition 2 in Pritchard and Wilson (2009) asserts that
(Xs − ns¯1)/√n converges in distribution to Zs := σ(s)
(
m
m−1
)1/2
(Z − Z¯1),
where Z = (Z1, . . . , Zm) is a vector of independent standard normal random
variables and Z¯ = (1/m)
∑m
j=1 Zj . In words, this means that the limit dis-
tributions of the vectors of normalized random variables Xs differ only in
a multiplicative constant, namely the standard deviation σ(s). This implies
Zs = (σ(s)/σ(s′))Zs
′
for any two scoring vectors s and s′. In particular, this also
holds for the associated order statistics (Zs(1), . . . , Z
s
(m)) and (Z
s′
(1), . . . , Z
s′
(m)),
with Zs(1) and Z
s′
(1) being the (limit) distributions of the highest scores. As a
consequence we obtain the following proposition.
Proposition 4.13 For all scoring vectors s and s′,
E[Zs(j)]− E[Zs(j+1)] = (σ(s)/σ(s′))
(
E[Zs
′
(j)]− E[Zs
′
(j+1)]
)
for all j = 1, . . . ,m− 1, where E denotes the expectation operator.
Proposition 4.13 implies that the difference in expected value between any
two consecutive scores is largest for rules based on scoring vectors with maximal
standard deviation. Since the vectors of random variables Zs have the same
distributions up to these standard deviations of the score vectors, and taking into
account that the probability of all alternatives having distinct scores converges
to 1 if the number of voters goes to infinity8, we have by the law of large
numbers that scoring rules ϕs with maximal standard deviation σ(s) have the
smallest proportion of manipulable profiles. The following result, of which for
completeness a proof is given in the Appendix, then implies that the k-approval
rule with k around m/2 is least manipulable if the number of voters becomes
large.
Proposition 4.14 Among all scoring vectors s, σ(s) is maximal if and only if
s1 = . . . = sk = 1 and sk+1 = . . . = sm = 0, where k = m/2 if m is even and
k ∈ {(m− 1)/2, (m+ 1)/2} if m is odd.
For ease of reference we formulate the main result of this subsection as a
corollary.
Corollary 4.15 Let k∗ denote the value(s) of k in Proposition 4.14 and let s
be an arbitrary scoring vector unequal to the scoring vector associated with k∗.
Then for n sufficiently large the proportion of manipulable profiles under ϕk∗ is
smaller than the proportion of manipulable profiles under ϕs.
8This is Proposition 3 in Pritchard and Wilson, 2009.
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This asymptotic result should be taken with some care, since the probability
of being able to manipulate becomes very small if the number of voters grows,
and so we are comparing small numbers. On the other hand there is some
evidence that already for a relatively small number of voters the k-approval rule
with k close to m/2 performs best, at least among the k-approval rules. See
Table 3 in the next section.
5 Some simulation results
Since general comparisons between the approval rule and k-approval rules are
complex and hard to obtain, we present here some results of simulations.9
Table 1 gives the approximate percentages of non-manipulable profiles for
the approval rule with 3–10 alternatives and 2, 3, 6, and 10 voters, based on
1,00,000 trials. While the number of trials is relatively low, we nevertheless
think that the numbers in the table give reliable impressions.
m 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
n = 2 worst comp 56 45 38 33 30 27 25 23
best comp 65 59 55 52 49 48 46 45
stoch comp 41 37 34 31 30 28 27 25
n = 3 worst comp 57 49 44 41 38 36 34 32
best comp 56 47 41 38 34 32 30 28
stoch comp 25 20 17 16 15 14 14 13
n = 6 worst comp 67 61 57 54 52 50 48 47
best comp 51 40 33 29 25 22 20 18
stoch comp 28 20 16 13 11 10 09 08
n = 10 worst comp 73 69 65 62 60 59 57 56
best comp 54 43 37 32 28 25 23 21
stoch comp 35 27 22 19 16 15 13 12
Table 1: Approximate percentages of non-manipulable preference profiles for the
approval rule, based on 1,00,000 trials.
Some conclusions can be drawn from this table. Clearly, the possibility of ma-
nipulation increases with the number of alternatives. For more than two voters
manipulability also increases from worst comparison to best comparison and
from best comparison to stochastic dominance comparison. This is not entirely
intuitive at first glance. One might expect that many profiles that are manip-
ulable under stochastic comparison are also manipulable under worst and best
comparison, since in order to improve under stochastic comparison a necessary
condition is that the worst and best alternatives of a set should not decrease
9We thank Bram Driesen for doing these simulations (with Matlab). They are based on
randomly drawing profiles and checking for non-manipulability using the characterizations in
Sections 3 and 4.
22
in preference. Thus, to explain the results in Table 1, it seems to be the case
that manipulation under stochastic comparison is often performed by improving
intermediate alternatives. Moreover, apparently this kind of manipulation can
often lead to comparable sets, in spite of the fact that stochastic dominance
preference is not complete.
As a final comment on Table 1, under worst comparison manipulability seems
to decrease with the number of voters, but under the other two preference
extensions manipulability first seems to increase and then to decrease again.
In Table 2 we present the results for k-approval rules for 6 alternatives;
2, 3, 6, or 10 voters; and again based on 1,00,000 trials. For comparison the
corresponding results for the approval rule from Table 1 are copied in Table 2.
(m = 6) k 1 2 3 4 5 Approval rule
n = 2 worst comp 100 54 45 40 83 33
best comp 100 60 35 100 100 52
stoch comp 100 93 50 40 83 31
n = 3 worst comp 44 57 61 32 56 41
best comp 100 63 51 48 100 38
stoch comp 100 30 54 35 56 16
n = 6 worst comp 60 64 60 51 25 54
best comp 50 59 50 46 78 29
stoch comp 34 41 24 16 16 13
n = 10 worst comp 69 70 68 64 56 62
best comp 45 56 52 40 51 32
stoch comp 29 36 31 27 07 19
Table 2: Approximate percentages of non-manipulable preference profiles for k-
approval rules and the approval rule, m = 6, based on 1,00,000 trials. (The
percentages equal to 100 are exact and reflect strategy-proofness in the involved
cases.)
Again we see that for relatively high numbers of voters manipulability seems to
increase from worst to best and from best to stochastic dominance comparison.
Further, for more than two voters the approval rule is outperformed by (at least)
the 3-approval rule as far as non-manipulability is concerned.
The final simulation results we present are collected in Table 3. This ta-
ble gives the percentages of non-manipulable preference profiles for k-approval
rules with k odd and the approval rule for 10 alternatives, 25 agents, based on
1,000,000 trials. We give more accurate numbers than in the other tables since
some differences are very small. A prudent observation is that the 5-approval
rule performs best with respect to (non-)manipulability among the odd values of
k (except for the case k = 9 and best comparison) – in line with the asymptotic
result in Section 4.6. Also, it performs better than the approval rule.
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m = 10 k 1 3 5 7 9 Approval rule
n = 25 worst comp 67.1 74.4 74.5 70.2 48.8 69.5
best comp 33.5 49.9 50.2 40.9 54.8 37.6
stoch comp 26.6 37.6 37.8 29.7 03.7 29.1
Table 3: Percentages of non-manipulable preference profiles for k-approval rules and
the approval rule, m = 10, n = 25, based on 1,000,000 trials.
6 Concluding remarks
We have characterized all (non-)manipulable preference profiles for the approval
rule and for k-approval rules. Our simulation results indicate that k-approval
voting may be a good substitute for approval voting. It preserves the simplicity
of the voting procedure characteristic for approval voting but tends to be less
manipulable. Asymptotically, the k-approval rule with k close to half of the
number of alternatives is even best among all scoring rules in this respect. This
result is in line with Pritchard and Wilson (2009), although their context is
somewhat different.
Our characterizations are also useful for studying ‘partial culture’ voting,
where uniform distribution of preference profiles is not assumed.
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Appendix: remaining proofs
Proof of Theorem 3.5. For the if-part, let s be an i-deviation of r, with
s(i) = (q(i), `(i)).
In case (a), ϕ (r) = ϕ (r−i)∪[ϕ− (r−i)∩βk(i) (w (i))]. If ϕ (r−i)∩β`(i) (q (i)) =
∅ then ϕ (s) = ϕ (r−i)∪ [ϕ− (r−i)∩β`(i) (q (i))] but this is not preferred to ϕ (r)
according to ºw(i). If ϕ (r−i)∩β`(i) (q (i)) 6= ∅ then ϕ (s) = ϕ (r−i)∩β`(i) (q (i))
which again is not preferred to ϕ (r) according to ºw(i) .
In case (b), ϕ(r) = ϕ(r−i)∩βk(i)(w(i)) and {x} ∼w(i) {y} for all x, y ∈ ϕ (r).
If ϕ (s) ⊆ ϕ (r) then ϕ (s) is not preferred to ϕ (r). Otherwise, there are z ∈
ϕ(s) ∩ ϕ(r−i) with (x, z) ∈ w(i) for all x ∈ ϕ(r). In that case too, ϕ (s) is not
preferred to ϕ (r) according to ºw(i) .
For case (c), note that ϕ (r) ⊆ ϕ (r−i) and thus, {x} ∼w(i) {y} for all
x, y ∈ ϕ (r). Also, {x} ºw(i) {y} for all x ∈ ϕ (r−i) and y ∈ ϕ− (r−i). So
ϕ (s) 6Âw(i) ϕ (r).
For the only-if part, suppose that there is a voter i ∈ N such that none of
the three cases (a)–(c) holds. It is sufficient to prove that ϕ (r) is manipulable at
profile r by voter i. By taking negations it follows that none of (a)–(c) holding
is equivalent to all of the following three statements holding for r and i.
1. (i) ϕ (r−i) 6⊆ A\βk(i) (w (i)) or (ii) ϕ− (r−i) ∩ βk(i) (w (i)) = ∅.
2. (i) ϕ (r−i) ∩ βk(i) (w (i)) = ∅ or (ii) for some x, y ∈ ϕ (r−i) ∩ βk(i) (w (i))
{x} Âw(i) {y} or (iii) A\βk(i) (w (i)) ∩ ϕ (r−i) = ∅.
3. (i) {x} Âw(i) {y} for some x, y ∈ ϕ (r−i) or (ii) there are x ∈ ϕ− (r−i)
such that {x} Âw(i) ϕ (r−i).
Requiring (1)–(3) to hold implies twelve cases to consider. However, 1(i)
and 2(i) are contradictory, so that ten cases are left. Now cases 1(i) & 2(ii) &
3(i); 1(i) & 2(ii) & 3(ii); 1(i) & 2(iii) & 3(i); 1(ii) & 2(ii) & 3(i); 1(ii) & 2(ii) &
3(ii); and 1(ii) & 2(iii) & 3(i) are covered by case I below. Case 1(ii) & 2(i) &
3(i) is covered by case II. Cases 1(i) & 2(iii) & 3(ii) and 1(ii) & 2(iii) & 3(ii) are
covered by case III. Lastly, case 1(ii) & 2(i) & 3(ii) is covered by case IV.
I. ϕ (r−i)∩ βk(i) (w (i)) 6= ∅ and there exist x, y ∈ ϕ (r−i)∩ βk(i) (w (i)) such
that {x} Âw(i) {y}.
II. ϕ (r−i) ⊆ [A\βk(i) (w (i))], ϕ− (r−i) ⊆ [A\βk(i) (w (i))] and there exist
x, y ∈ ϕ (r−i) such that {x} Âw(i) {y}.
III. ϕ (r−i) ⊆ βk(i) (w (i)) and there exist x ∈ ϕ− (r−i) such that {x} Âw(i) {y}
for all y ∈ ϕ (r−i) .
IV. ϕ (r−i) ⊆ [A\βk(i) (w (i))], ϕ− (r−i) ⊆ [A\βk(i) (w (i))] and there exist
x ∈ ϕ− (r−i) such that {x} Âw(i) {y} for all y ∈ ϕ (r−i).
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In cases I and II, take b ∈ β (w(i)|ϕ(r−i)) and consider the report s(i) =
(w′(i), 1) of voter i such that β(w′(i)) = {b}. Then by (1), ϕ(s) = {b}. In
case I, ϕ(r) = ϕ (r−i) ∩ βk(i) (w (i)), so by the second condition in I, ϕ(s) =
{b} Âw(i) ϕ(r). In case II, ϕ(r) = ϕ(r−i), and by the last condition in case II,
again ϕ(s) = {b} Âw(i) ϕ(r).
In both cases III and IV, ϕ(r) = ϕ(r−i). Take x ∈ ϕ− (r−i) such that
{x} Âw(i) {y} for all y ∈ ϕ (r−i). Consider the report s(i) = (w′(i), 1) of voter
i such that β(w′(i)) = {x}. Then by (1), ϕ(s) = {x} ∪ ϕ(r−i). This implies
ϕ(s) = {b} Âw(i) ϕ(r). ¤
Proof of Theorem 4.3. For the if-part, let q be an i-deviation of p. Note that
ϕk(p−i) = ϕk(q−i) and ϕ−k (p−i) = ϕ
−
k (q−i). Assume that at least one of the
cases (a)–(e) holds. We show that voter i cannot manipulate from p to q.
In case (a), we have ϕk(p) = ϕk(p−i) ∩ βk(p(i)) and ϕk(q) = ϕk(p) or
ϕk(q)∩ [A\βk(p(i))] 6= ∅. In both cases, it is easy to see that ϕk(p) ºp(i) ϕk(q).
In case (b), ϕk(p) = ϕk(p−i)∪ [ϕ−k (p−i)∩βk(p(i))]. If βk(q(i))∩ϕk(p−i) = ∅
then ϕk(q) = ϕk(p−i)∪ [ϕ−k (p−i)∩ βk(q(i))] but this is never preferred to ϕk(p)
according to ºp(i). If βk(q(i)) ∩ ϕk(p−i) 6= ∅ then ϕk(q) = βk(q(i)) ∩ ϕk(p−i),
which again is never preferred to ϕk(p) according to ºp(i).
In case (c), (d), and (e), ϕk(p) = {w}. If ϕk(q) 6= {w} then x ∈ ϕk(q)
for some x ∈ L(w, p(i)) \ {w}. In that case ϕk(q) is never preferred to ϕk(p)
according to ºp(i).
For the only-if part, suppose that there is a voter i ∈ N such that none of
the five cases (a)–(e) holds. It is sufficient to prove that ϕk is manipulable at
profile p by voter i.
By taking negations it follows that none of (a)–(e) holding is equivalent to
all of the following four statements holding for p and i.
I (i) A \ βk(p(i)) 6⊆ ϕk(p−i) or (ii) A \ βk(p(i)) = ϕk(p−i).
II (i) ϕk(p−i) 6⊆ [A \ βk(p(i))] or (ii) ϕ−k (p−i) ∩ βk(p(i)) = ∅.
III (i) |ϕk(p−i)∩βk(p(i))| ≥ 2 or (ii) ϕk(p−i)∩βk(p(i)) = ∅ or (iii) ϕk(p−i) ⊆
βk(p(i)).
IV (i) |ϕk(p−i)| > 1 or (ii) [ϕk(p−i) = {w} for some w ∈ A and ϕ−k (p−i) 6⊆
L(w, p(i)) and |ϕ−k (p−i) ∩ L(w, p(i))| ≤ m− k ].
Requiring (I)–(IV) to hold implies 24 cases to consider. However, the following
combinations are contradictory: I(ii) and III(i); I(ii) and III(iii); II(i) and III(ii);
and III(i) and IV(ii). Moreover, III(iii) and IV(i) together imply III(i), so that
we do not have the case with IV(i) and III(iii) separately. This leaves eight
cases, which we will consider two at a time.
A. Cases I(i) & II(i) & III(i) & IV(i) and I(i) & II(ii) & III(i) & IV(i). These
two cases are covered by the following assumptions: |ϕk(p−i) ∩ βk(p(i))| ≥ 2
and A \ βk(p(i)) 6⊆ ϕk(p−i).
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In this case we have ϕk(p) = ϕk(p−i) ∩ βk(p(i)). Let
w = ω
(
p(i)|ϕk(p−i)∩βk(p(i))
)
. Then we can construct an i-deviation q of p
such that ϕk(p−i) ∩ βk(q(i)) = [ϕk(p−i) ∩ βk(p(i))] \ {w}. Then ϕk(q) =
[ϕk(p−i) ∩ βk(p(i))] \ {w} and, thus, ϕk(q) ºp(i) ϕk(p).
B. Cases I(i) & II(ii) & III(ii) & IV(i) and I(ii) & II(ii) & III(ii) & IV(i).
These two cases are covered by the following assumptions: |ϕk(p−i)| > 1 and
ϕk(p−i) ∩ βk(p(i)) = ∅ and ϕ−k (p−i) ∩ βk(p(i)) = ∅.
In this case we have ϕk(p) = ϕk(p−i). Let b = β
(
p(i)|ϕk(p−i)
)
. We can
construct an i-deviation q of p such that ϕk(p−i)∩βk(q(i)) = {b}. Then ϕk(q) =
{b} Âp(i) ϕk(p−i) = ϕk(p).
C. Cases I(i) & II(ii) & III(ii) & IV(ii) and I(ii) & II(ii) & III(ii) & IV(ii).
These two cases are covered by the following assumptions: [ϕk(p−i) = {w} for
some w ∈ A and ϕ−k (p−i) 6⊆ L(w, p(i)) and |ϕ−k (p−i)∩L(w, p(i))| ≤ m− k ] and
ϕk(p−i) ∩ βk(p(i)) = ∅ and ϕ−k (p−i) ∩ βk(p(i)) = ∅.
In this case ϕk(p) = {w}. Let b = β
(
p(i)|ϕ−k (p−i)
)
. Then (b, w) ∈ p(i)
since ϕ−k (p−i) 6⊆ L(w, p(i)). Construct an i-deviation q of p such that ϕ−k (p−i)∩
βk(q(i)) = {b}. Then ϕk(q) = {b, w} Âp(i) {b} = ϕk(p).
D. Cases I(i) & II(i) & III(iii) & IV(ii) and I(i) & II(ii) & III(iii) & IV(ii).
These cases are covered by the assumptions: [ϕk(p−i) = {w} for some w ∈ A
and ϕ−k (p−i) 6⊆ L(w, p(i)) and |ϕ−k (p−i) ∩ L(w, p(i))| ≤ m − k ] and ϕk(p−i) ⊆
βk(p(i)).
In this case, ϕk(p) = {w}. We can construct an i-deviation q of p such that
ϕ−k (p−i) ∩ L(w, p(i)) ⊆ A \ βk(q(i)). Then ϕk(q) = {w} ∪
[
ϕ−k (p−i) ∩ βk(q(i))
]
.
The set ϕ−k (p−i)∩βk(q(i)) is non-empty and contains only points x with (x,w) ∈
p(i). Hence, ϕk(q) Âp(i) ϕk(p). ¤
Proof of Corollary 4.7. For 2 ≤ k ≤ (m+ 1)/2 we have
η(m, k) =
m! k2 [(m− k)!]2
(m− 2k + 1)!
by Theorem 4.6. By a few elementary computations we obtain for 2 ≤ k ≤
(m+ 1)/2− 1:
η(m, k) < [>] η(m, k+1)⇔ (m−k)2k2 < [>] (k+1)2(m−2k+1)(m−2k) . (∗)
Denote A := (k+1)2(m−2k+1)(m−2k), then A > (k+1)2(m−2k)2 and this
latter expression at least as large as (m− k)2k2 if and only if k2 + 2k −m ≤ 0,
which, in turn, holds if and only if k ≤ √m+ 1− 1. Thus, by (∗),
k ≤ k := √m+ 1− 1⇒ η(m, k) < η(m, k + 1) .
Similarly, A < (k+1)2(m−2k+1)2 and this latter expression is not larger than
(m− k)2k2 if and only if k2+ k− (m+1) ≥ 0, which, in turn, holds if and only
if k ≥ 12
√
1 + 4(m+ 1)− 12 . Thus, by (∗),
k ≥ k := 1
2
√
1 + 4(m+ 1)− 1
2
⇒ η(m, k) > η(m, k + 1) .
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It is straightforward to derive that k < k < (m + 1)/2 and k − k < 1. Now
statement (a) follows by taking k∗ = b k c + 1 or k∗ ∈ {b k c + 1, b k c + 2},
depending on the exact values of k and k.
For m− 1 ≥ k > (m+ 1)/2 we have
η(m, k) =
m! k! k!
(2k −m)!
by Theorem 4.6. To go from η(m, k) to η(m, k + 1) we multiply by a factor
(k+1)2/(2k−m+2)(2k−m+1), which is larger than 1 since k+1 ≥ 2k−m+2.
This proves statement (b).
To show statement (c) we have to show α(m, k) < 1 for all 2 ≤ k ≤ (m+1)/2,
where α(m, k) = η(m, k)/η(m,m− 1). By a simple computation we derive
α(m+ 1, k) = α(m, k) · (m+ 1− k)
2
m2 (m− 2k + 2) .
Since (m+1−k)2 < m2 and m−2k+2 ≥ 1, this implies α(m+1, k) < α(m, k).
Hence, to show α(m, k) < 1 for all 2 ≤ k ≤ (m + 1)/2, it is sufficient to show
α(2k + 1, k) < 1 for all k ≥ 2. We show this by induction on k. For k = 2 we
have α(5, 2) = 3/4 < 1. Now assume α(2k + 1, k) < 1 then it is sufficient to
show α(2k + 3, k + 1) < 1. To show this, by straightforward computation we
have
α(2k + 3, k + 1) = α(2k + 1, k) · (k + 2)
2
2k · (2k + 1) .
By the induction hypothesis and since (k + 2)2 < 2k · (2k + 1) for k ≥ 2, we
obtain α(2k + 3, k + 1) < 1. ¤
Proof of Proposition 4.14. Let s be an arbitrary scoring vector. We will
prove the proposition for the variance σ2(s), and first show that for σ2(s) to be
maximal every coordinate of s has to be equal to 0 or 1. Let j ∈ {2, . . . ,m− 1}
be arbitrary and write
σ2(s) =
1
m
∑
i 6=j
s2i + s
2
j −m
(∑
i 6=j si + sj
m
)2 .
Differentiating with respect to sj , we obtain after simplification:
dσ2(s)
dsj
=
2(m− 1)
m2
[
sj −
∑
i 6=j si
m− 1
]
.
This implies dσ
2(s)
dsj
> (=, <) 0 exactly when sj > (=, <)
∑
i 6=j si
m−1 . In turn, this
implies that with respect to sj the variance σ2(s) is maximal for sj = 0 or
sj = 1.
Second, let σ2(k) denote the variance of the scoring vector associated with
the k-approval rule. Then it is simple to verify that σ2(k) = (1/m)[k − k2/m],
which implies that σ2(k) is maximal exactly if k ∈ {(m − 1)/2, (m + 1)/2} for
m odd and k = m/2 for m even.
The proof is complete by combining the two arguments. ¤
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